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Abstract—Communications play a vital role in the response
to disasters and crises. However, existing communications infras-
tructure is often impaired, destroyed or overwhelmed during
such events. This leads to the use of substitute communica-
tions solutions including analog two-way radio or unsecured
internet access. Often provided by unknown third parties, these
solutions may have less sophisticated security characteristics
than is desirable. While substitute communications are often
invaluable, care is required to minimize the risk to NGOs and
individuals stemming from the use of communications channels
with reduced or unknown security properties. This is particularly
true if private information is involved, including the location and
disposition of individuals and first responders. In this work we
enumerate the principal risks and challenges that may arise, and
provide practical guidelines for mitigating them during crises.
We take plausible threats from contemporary disaster and crisis
events into account and discuss the security and privacy features
of state-of-the-art communications mechanisms.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
Communications is an important “force-multiplier” during
disasters and crises [1]. The challenge, of course, is that during
such events communications capability is typically reduced,
while, conversely, demand for communications increases. This
often creates, or broadens, the gap between what the indige-
nous communications capacity can provide, and the demands
placed upon it. As a result supplementary communications
capabilities are often bought into disaster and crisis zones in
an attempt to bridge this gap. A problem arises, however, in
that the security properties of the collection of communications
options available in a disaster zone may not be immediately
apparent, and as adversaries become more and more active
during disaster response activities [2], there is a compelling
need to provide responders with practical evidence-based
information that will allow them to make informed decisions
about their use of the available resources, so as to maximize
their mission effectiveness, while minimizing the risk for
harm.
B. Contribution
The primary contribution of this paper is to translate
understanding generated through recent information security
research into a form where it can be of direct use by those
engaged in providing and using communications technologies
during disasters and crises. To address this goal, we analyze
and identify the most significant security requirements, pos-
sible threats and challenges for communications technologies
used during disasters and crises. We also summarize several
existing technologies utilized by responders as communication
channels during disaster, their assumptions as well as security
features they offer. Finally, we provide, using a flow chart, a
useful guideline to select a suitable technology, which takes
into account possible attacks that could arise during disaster
scenarios.
C. Outline
This paper is structured as follows: first, representative
communication scenarios in a disaster situation are presented.
Next, adversary and threat models are discussed. Subse-
quently, the main security features considered in this paper
are analyzed, followed by a description of the communication
technologies used in emergency scenarios and their security
weaknesses. Finally, practical guidelines for mitigating the
risks and challenges from the use of different communication
channels during crises are discussed. We conclude the paper
providing potential future research directions.
D. First of a series
In recognition that this is a constantly evolving situation,
and that it is impossible for any one paper to exhaustively
explore this space, it is our intention that this guidelines paper
is the first in a series. Successors will attempt to include further
technologies and responses to the predominant prevailing
threats and explore mitigation strategies as they evolve.
II. SCENARIOS
There is naturally partial commonality between information
security scenarios between crisis and non-crisis contexts. The
purpose of this paper is, however, to address the particular
needs of crisis responders. In this section we define what we
mean by crisis, and enumerate scenarios that are known to
occur in crisis situations.
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A. Definition of a disaster or crisis
There is considerable variation in the definition of a disaster,
both in terms of the scope of the kind of events included, as
well in the nomenclature used [3]. Authors in [3] explored the
existing literature covering the definition of the term disaster,
discovering hundreds of variant definitions. From those, they
proposed the following as the most consistent definition of a
disaster, a definition which shall be assumed throughout this
paper to cover the events of interest. In this paper, a crisis is
considered to be a variant descriptor for a disaster.
‘..the widespread disruption and damage to a com-
munity that exceeds its ability to cope and over-
whelms its resources.’ [3]
This procedurally generated consensus definition is in strong
agreement with the definition produced by the United Nations
for disaster:
‘..A serious disruption of the functioning of a com-
munity or a society involving widespread human,
material, economic or environmental losses and im-
pacts, which exceeds the ability of the affected com-
munity or society to cope using its own resources.’
[4]
That is, the overarching defining characteristic of a disaster,
as compared to, for example, an accident or other non-
disastrous undesirable event, is that in a disaster, there is a
need for external support. In the case where a disaster involves
communications, this implies that additional communications
capability or capacity is required to be introduced to the
disaster zone. This may then require that responders, residents,
existing services and authorities, and any other parties active in
the disaster zone, resort to communications tools, technologies,
suppliers and/or media that they would not normally use. As
a result, the resulting communications may have drastically
different security properties compared with the regular use. It
is from this context that the following scenarios are derived.
B. Use of unknown or insecure internet connectivity
Perhaps the simplest scenario is using internet connectivity,
possibly provided by unknown parties, for whatever purposes
are necessary. Here the scenario is simply that the security
properties of the internet connectivity are unknown. It may
also be that existing internet connectivity is being used, but
which is not adequately secured. For example, disaster respon-
ders may come into a disaster zone, and make use of existing
indigenous internet connectivity, that may not be as secure as
they are normally accustomed to. Possible risks include that
the connectivity may be surveilled, censored, inter-mediated
or otherwise interfered with by some party, whether or not
they are the supplier of the internet connectivity. For example,
a militia or other informal power-block may monitor internet
communications in order to gain advantage or further their
victimization of others. In some locations it is also possible
that surveillance may be used to gather material in order to
seek expulsion or incite or commit extra-judicial violence or
other actions against disaster responders, e.g., in areas where
religious or other extremist activity is present.
C. Communications between personnel within organizations
Where conventional communications are disrupted, it may
be necessary to use personal communications media that are
less secure than those ordinarily used. For example, analog
or digital radios may be used in place of cellular mobile
telephony. Or alternatively, mobile telephony standards may
be used that offer inferior security properties, such as 2G (and
some 3G) GSM networks. In such cases, many of the same
risks can arise as when using internet connectivity. That is,
communications may be eavesdropped, falsified, or otherwise
interfered with. Eavesdropping alone can pose a significant
risk to personnel, when it allows hostile actors to anticipate
their movements and disposition. A complication that can arise
is that in some locations it may be desirable for an organization
to communicate in the clear, so as to avoid causing anxiety
for the government in the disaster zone.
D. Communications between organizations
Communications between organizations is in many regards
isometric to communications within organization, but with
any negative impacts being able to affect more than a single
organization.
E. Dissemination of public safety or similar information
Public dissemination of information differs strongly from
the above scenarios, where confidentiality is a prominent
requirement. Instead, for public dissemination of information
it must be readable by all parties, and thus sent in the clear, but
it must also be authentic, that is not impersonable, and it must
not be able to be modified, which could lead to dangerous
mis-informing of recipients. A further issue is timeliness of
the information, so that only information that is still correct
and useful is received, and cannot be replayed at a later time
by a hostile party.
III. ADVERSARY AND THREAT MODELS
A user in a communication network during a disaster can
act in any of the following roles: (1) an honest user, who
contributes to the communication, cooperates with neighbors,
acts according to the specified protocols, rules, etc, or, (2) a
malicious user, who tries to manipulate or subvert the normal
communications. An adversary’s behavior and the impact of an
attack can vary according to the capabilities of the adversary
as well as the scenario or situation in which an attack occurs.
Whether an adversary works alone and independently (single
attacker), as compared to whether they collaborate with other
malicious users (colluding attacker), this will depend on the
goals of an attack, but also on the motivation of these attacks.
On the one hand colluding attackers can be desperate people,
who try to take advantage of available resources without
regard for others, for example, to meet their basic needs for
food, shelter and other materials. For these actors, they can
perhaps be modeled from a game theory perspective as seeing
the situation as a zero-sum game, and they are seeking to
maximize their gain, without being arrested by the fact that
it necessarily increases the loss of other parties. That is, their
objective is their gain, rather than the loss of others. On the
other hand, there can be actors such as terrorists, who can also
be colluding attackers, but who are actively trying to exploit
destruction and chaos in the civilian communication causing
panic and confusion, and can perhaps be modeled from a
game-theory perspective as seeking to minimize the sum of the
game from the perspective of other parties. That is, rather than
failing to be arrested by the presence of a zero-sum game, they
are actively motivated by this. As this analysis reveals, while
their motivations, and thus modes of operation may differ, they
have the same final effect of undertaking actions that induces
losses upon other parties. In this subsection we are going to
give a high level overview of possible adversaries that can be
considered during a disaster scenario:
• Non-cooperative user’s behavior: In some situations
when normal users (civilian or organization) compete to
gain some limited resources, they may cease cooperative
actions, as they actively seek to optimize their own
resources. Their behavior can affect the entire commu-
nications channel as a whole.
• Militias: Haiti Earthquake of 2011 saw many examples
of this kind of adversary [5]. Militias broke into stores
and induced a state of violence and anarchy. Without
a security mechanism for communication channels, the
militias are able to listen to the communications of others,
and use this intelligence to their advantage, and therefore
the disadvantage of others [6].
• Terrorists: A terrorist has different purpose that vary
according to the situation: creating fear in the population,
gaining international publicity for a terror group, but also
supporting political or religious ideology, perceived or
actual inequitable treatment, among other factors [7], [8].
• Looter: During the Katrina Hurricane of 2005, fabricated
reports of the shooting of rescuers and civilians, act of
violence, etc., were reported [9]. The spread of rumors
about looting and the lack of authority’s presence con-
tributed to a general rise in panic and wide distribution
of inaccurate information to citizens. Attackers used this
information and looted abandoned properties or tried to
take the resources of isolated community residents.
• Political motivated organizations: In the Russian - Geor-
gia conflict of 2008, governmental and civilian infrastruc-
ture was the victim of cyber attacks, whose main purposes
was to disrupt and to compromise the communication
within Georgia, as well as to gather intelligence from
and about military and political groups [10].
In this section, we describe possible mechanisms that can be
used by an adversary in order to achieve an attack:
1) Eavesdropping: Passive eavesdroppers will attempt to
intercept the location information or movement patterns
of users, e.g., to collect social graphs of participants. A
malicious user can use this information for subsequent
attacks.
2) Message tampering: Attackers can inject false location
information or modify legitimate information affecting
the reliability or truth in such networks. For example,
an adversary may distribute fabricated information about
available local infrastructure (e.g., hospitals or shelters
locations) to overload them.
3) Identity theft: Adversaries may pretend to be valid
users, or other legitimate identities. For example, they
could pretend to be a trusted authority, such as the
government or a well-known NGO, and send false in-
formation about a disaster which does not exist, causing
panic among the populace.
4) Jamming: Attackers may block future packets or the
communication channels between normal users. By de-
liberately interfering in this way, users can be prevented
from communicating with other devices, and produce a
lack of availability. Single or colluding attackers may try
to interfere with data sent by authorities, e.g., warnings
or announcements about potential hazards, to further
amplify the effect of their attack. For example, by main-
taining the impression that the communications channels
are operative, e.g., by allowing all other communications
to continue unimpaired, thus reinforcing the implicit
belief among other parties that there are no suppressed
communications.
IV. INFORMATION SECURITY MODEL
We identify the main security properties considered in this
paper when choosing a specific system for a crisis.
A. Confidentiality (that no one else can listen in)
There are scenarios, where it is important to ensure that only
the specified person can read the exchanged information [5],
[10]. Attacks to this property attempt to get access to sensitive
information without accurate authorization. Hence, different
methods and mechanisms are necessary to keep the content of
a message secret from unauthorized users. In certain scenarios,
however, where the data is public by itself, this property may
be not mandatory, or even desirable.
B. Integrity (that communications cannot be modified)
Attacks to the integrity of communications attempt to mod-
ify legitimate information, for example replacing the text of
a communications with text of the attackers choosing. In this
context it is necessary to verify if the exchanged information
between two parties was altered during transmission, as well
as to protect the content of a message against any alteration.
In most cases, this is a mandatory property, as otherwise an
attacker could maliciously cause arbitrary mis-information.
C. Authenticity (that no one can impersonate another)
The receiver of a message should be able to corroborate
that the purported sender is in fact the authentic author of the
communication [9], e.g., for public alerts or warnings from
rescuers. Without such an authentication mechanism, users
could impersonate one another, with considerable scope for
disseminating mis-information with malicious intent.
D. Validity (that a communication is fresh, and has not been
superseded by another)
In some scenarios it is important to verify if the exchanged
data is still valid data [9]. Without a mechanism to verify
the freshness of the information, an adversary can replay old
messages without being detected, and the old data may not
merely be of reduced value, but may in fact be harmful. For
example, an attacker could re-play messages indicating that
particular places are safe (or unsafe) to influence the activities
of people and/or agencies to their advantage.
E. Anonymity, Privacy, Social Accountability and Non-
Repudiability
Anonymity, privacy, social accountability and non-
repudiability represent an additional set of security properties
that are particularly important when private persons
communicate with one another, with the public at large,
and in some cases, with government and authorities. Together,
they allow users to interact without excessive fear of the
consequences of their communications, or of the consequences
of the communications activities of others (including passive
collection of communications). However, the focus of this
paper is on communications among persons and organizations
where the opposite is the case: where it is highly desirable for
the authenticity of persons and their actions to be sustained.
Therefore these topics are not within the scope of this paper.
However, they are not necessarily irrelevant to all disaster
scenarios: their importance can differ according to the nature
of the emergency scenario. For example, anonymity can be
of significant importance in scenarios where a government
controls communication channels. In such cases, it is
important that the opposition or other people with differing
opinions or anti-government positions cannot be identified, or
at least cannot be distinguished among a group of senders. An
example of this is following the 2008 Sichuan Earthquake in
China, where a teacher was sentenced to one year of prison,
because he posted photos about the damage occasioned by
the earthquake on schools [11].
V. COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES
Different technologies can be used in the communication
between organizations and civilians after disaster scenarios.
These systems, however, may suffer a lack of security, pro-
viding either none or weakened security feature(s). This is
particularly the case for security features that depend on some
kind of centralized infrastructure. For example, many commu-
nications systems offer security features that depend on the
availability of centralized infrastructure, e.g., internet access
is often required to check the validity of digital certificates.
The following text describes a number of the communications
technologies that are often provided post-disaster, and explores
their security properties.
A. Infrastructure-less technologies
1) Analog Radio: Analog radio has played a prominent
role in disaster communications for many decades, and as our
private correspondence with New Zealand Red Cross confirms,
this role continues to the present. In particular, Ultra High
Frequency (UHF) and Very High Frequency (VHF) hand-held
radios are frequently used to provide communications among
personnel deployed during and following disasters. High Fre-
quency (HF) radio is still present in many situations, however
NZ Red Cross informs us that its role is diminishing, and is
increasingly being replaced in the field by lower-cost satellite
based-solutions, such as the deLorme inReach [12], that allows
global communications reach, without the complications of
maintaining and operating an HF radio installation, including
ensuring that trained personnel are available.
Analog radio is also an unsecured broadcast medium. That
is, any party with a suitable radio is able to listen to all
communications. Indeed, all parties must listen to all commu-
nications if they are to hear communications that are intended
for them. In some situations this broadcast nature is helpful, for
example, when information is non-confidential, and desirable
for multiple parties to receive, e.g., the disposition of members
of a team as they carry out their activities. However, even in
such cases, adversaries are able to easily listen to communica-
tions, replay recorded communications (simply by recording
the transmissions of others on a channel, and then replaying
them into the microphone of a radio at a later time), or to
more actively participate in communications in a variety of
subversive, or even merely disruptive manners. This is because
analog radio is lacks confidentiality, authenticity and integrity.
2) Digital Radio: The arch-typical example of this tech-
nology in Europe is Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA),
which allows the exchange of speech and status messaging
with a limited data rate. Digital radio systems offer some
improvements over analog radio, in that communications of-
ten supports confidentiality, and some digital radio systems
can authenticate communications, and ensure their integrity.
However, this is not the case for all digital radio systems,
and care must be taken to gain an adequate understanding of
how confidentiality, authentication and integrity are provided
by the radio system, and how they can be protected against
common attack paths, such as theft, loss of a radio handset
or traffic analysis, which imply a significant threat in some
environments, e.g., in presence of militias. Also, some digital
radio systems require supporting infrastructure, such as a base
station or central repeater.
3) Off-grid ad-hoc networks: In addition to the traditional
analog and digital radio communications system, distributed
mobile ad hoc networks (MANET) have been developed
over the past twenty years or so, primarily enabled by
the development of 802.11 Wi-Fi [13], [14]. The general
intent of such networks can be summarized as facilitating
the creation of networks, without reliance on conventional
fixed infrastructure. Within the humanitarian space, projects
of potential interest include, without limitation, the FreiFunk
and associated projects in Europe [15], [16], the Commotion
Wireless project from the USA [17], [18], and the Serval
Project from Australia [19]–[22].
Each of these projects has a particular focus, for example,
FreiFunk and the related movement can be perhaps simply
summarized as facilitating the provision of (typically wireless)
internet access, independent of existing infrastructure. The
Commotion Wireless project is primarily interested in pro-
viding secured internet and intranet access in difficult environ-
ments, such as providing communications for dissidents under
oppressive regimes. The Serval Project is primarily focused
on providing secured mobile telecommunications, without
dependence on existing infrastructure, with an emphasis on
disaster response and isolated communities. The differing
approaches and intentions of each projects results in a diversity
of security properties of these networks. However, many
modern incarnations pay particular attention to the issues of
confidentiality, authenticity and integrity of communications—
including the difficult matter of managing the routing of
communications among the devices in a MANET [23], [24].
When contemplating using such systems, particular emphasis
should be placed on ensuring an appropriate fit for the security
requirements at hand.
B. Infrastructure-based technologies
1) Cellular Networks: Cellular networks were designed
to provide voice applications based on digital technology,
and offer improved confidentiality, authentication and integrity
compared with the first generation analog cellular networks.
While the situation has improved with each successive gener-
ation of cellular technology, significant security issues remain
and are constantly uncovered. Different studies and important
examples [25]–[27] have demonstrated the feasibility of some
attacks exploiting successfully the existing vulnerabilities and
weaknesses of the underlying standards or poor operational
practice by operators, e.g., by redirecting user traffic or theft
of valid user identities, particularly in the face of a determined
adversary who has the means to obtain specialized hard-
ware that allows interception of 2G and 3G communications
with relative ease. Such hardware is available for less than
US$1,000, placing such attacks well within the reach of many
adversaries.
Also, cellular networks are designed with “lawful intercept”
capability included, and therefore any use of such networks
must take into account that not only the local government, but
also potential adversaries with sympathizers within cellular
carriers, may be able to intercept all communications, and use
the advanced location capabilities of modern cellular base-
stations to obtain pervasive location data on users, including
reliable predictions of where users are likely to be at a future
time and date. This can be particularly hazardous in civil
unrest situations, where one or more of the belligerents have
reason to be opposed to the delivery of humanitarian relief in
an area. For example, the authors are aware through private
correspondence of situations where the resources of cellular
networks and/or ISPs are alleged to be made available to such
parties, and where that information has apparently been used
to target relief workers.
2) Satellite Radio: Satellite communication can offer high-
speed data and video transmission in crisis. Many systems,
however, suffer problems such as weak security properties,
problems with synchronization, and in some countries, their
use during disasters may not be allowed. Notwithstanding
the above difficulties, newer satellite communications tools,
such as short-burst-data (SBD) modules connected to the
Iridium constellation offer the ability to communicate from
most locations on the surface of the earth using an SMS-like
interface, and only a small battery powered satellite terminal
that can be carried in a pocket, and can pair with a smart-
phone. However, the security on the Iridium SBD service has
to be described by ‘security by obscurity’.
There is sound reason to believe why a determined attacker
could listen to all Iridium SBD data directed to a given locale,
by demodulating the broadcast signal from each satellite as
it passes overhead, using only a few hundred dollars of
equipment [28]. This attack is particularly concerning, because
it would seem that the SMS-like service is unencrypted, and
could be relatively easily spoofed. That is, a determined
adversary could potentially transmit signals that an Iridium
SBD would interpret as having come from a satellite, thus
allowing an adversary to inject themselves arbitrarily into
conversations. Because the transmissions from the satellites
are unencrypted, this could be implemented in a manner that
uses intelligence gathered from the transmissions to allow the
mounting of sophisticated attacks that would be difficult for
an end-user to detect.
3) Social media: In recent years, different disaster scenar-
ios have widely shown the importance and benefits of social
media (e.g., twitter, facebook, webblogs, wikis and other web-
based resources) in such situations [5], [6], [29], [30]. These
media enable a communication channel between the different
actors in the disaster area, but also facilitate the coordination,
organization and involve spontaneous volunteers and civilians
in the rescue efforts. Platforms such as crowd-sourcing and
related mapping tools have begun to play prominent roles
following disasters, allowing important information to be
collected, classified and organized, greatly increasing its value
and utility in the response effort.
These communications channels, however, build on existing
communications infrastructures—mainly the internet—with a
central infrastructure, which itself may be affected after a
disaster. Due to the huge volumes of data and redundant
information generated by such media, the identification of
relevant messages without an appropriate prioritization of the
information can be difficult, affecting the ability for a prompt
and efficient response by rescuers organizations. An interesting
example was Hurricane Sandy in 2012, where more than
20 million tweets about the disaster were generated [31].
Furthermore, the open nature of social media (every person
can publish new information, or repeat existing information)
complicates the validation of the data being spread, making
it easier for malicious users to manipulate data, or in some
cases, cause the spread of false information. The Safety Check
feature activated by Facebook after the Nepal earthquake in
2015, was a good example of the misuse of social media during
disaster scenarios [32].
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AND THEIR SECURITY FEATURES IN DISASTER SCENARIOS
Technology Examples Security Features Comments
voice text
Infrastructure-less Technologies
Analog Radio
HF radio 0 n.a. In situations where it is desirable to send non-confidential information and to reach multiple
parties, the broadcast property of analog radio is very helpful. Due to the broadcast
nature of this medium, however, any party with a suitable radio is able to listen all
communications, or replay old recorded communications. That is, confidentiality, integrity,
authenticity and validity are not provided by analog radio.
Digital Radio
TETRA,
Project
25
C*, I*, A*, C*, I*, A* Digital radio provides several improvements over analog radio. Some level of security such
as confidentiality, authentication, etc, can be provided by these radio systems. Nevertheless,
different analyses [33], [34] have identified significant security weaknesses of these system,
which lead to potential attacks that could affect the provided security features such as
confidentiality, etc. For example, an adversary can get access to sensitive data, track devices
or analysis exchanged traffic. Furthermore some digital radio systems still require some
form of supporting central infrastructure.
Off-grid ad-hoc networks
Commotion
Wireless,
FreiFunk,
Serval
Project
C*, I*, A* C*, I*, A* MANETs have emerged over the past twenty years to enable a communication without
reliance on traditional fixed infrastructure. Different projects focused on MANETs as
a viable solution to implement multi-hop communication in emergency scenarios [23],
[24]. These technologies have the potential to provide advanced security properties,
e.g., confidentiality and authentication, without recourse to any centralized or fixed
infrastructure [35], however care should be taken to verify that the desired properties
are provided by the particular system being considered.
Infrastructure-based Technologies
Satellite Radio
Iridium,
VSAT,
Inmarsat-
C
C*, I*, A* C*, I*, A* Satellite communications are widely used in different scenarios, including in emergency
communications. In 2014 IOActive [36] evaluated several satellite communication systems
and identified numerous vulnerabilities that attackers could exploit. For example, attackers
can disrupt all communications on some satellite systems by compromising just a few
devices.
2G 0 0 2G Cellular networks suffer from inherent security weaknesses. These weaknesses arose
during the rapidly growth of cellular networks, particularly as they began to carry data as
well as voice. Existing vulnerabilities such as affecting the availability, redirecting user
traffic or cloning valid user identities, represent several of the readily exploitable security
flaws of 2G networks. Although 2G networks use different encryption methods, some of
the mandatory mechanisms do not provide any security and are vulnerable to some attacks.
Sound operational security is of utmost importance in 2G networks.
Cellular Networks
3G C*, I*, A* C*, I*, A* 3G Cellular networks provide improvements, new functionality and security features over
2G networks. These networks, however, also inherit some vulnerabilities and threats from
2G, e.g., flooding attacks, which exploit paging vulnerabilities in both cellular network
generations. 3G cellular networks implement different countermeasures to avoid many of
the 2G vulnerabilities. These countermeasures, however, have no effect in dual operation
mode, that is when 2G and 3G networks employ the base stations simultaneously (inter-
operation between 2G/3G networks), which is still common in many countries [25].
4G C*, I*, A* C*, I*, A* The security measures of 4G networks are very similar to those of the 3G Cellular
networks. The main additional security improvements of 4G networks are focused on
key management and protection against physical attacks against base stations. Nonetheless,
some security issues still remain a problem in the 4G networks. Some studies have already
identified security vulnerabilities in the architecture of 4G networks [37]–[39].
Online
Social
Networks
Twitter,
Facebook
0 0 The use of social media such as twitter or facebook in disaster scenarios, has increased
rapidly. Such networks provide many opportunities to users e.g., to share information,
photos or news, and to organize each other. Their wide availability and diverse facilities
make them valuable to spread information widely in a short period of time. However, those
same characteristics can be abused by adversaries, e.g., by creating multiple fabricated
identities and using those to spread false information [40].
Social media
Email
service
Gmail,
Yahoo
n.a. C*, I*, A* Communications media that can operate with only intermittent connectivity, such as email,
are also important tools in disaster response, allowing some form for data exchange
between different parties. Nonetheless, the internet based platforms are provisioned and
operated by untrusted third parties, and their security depends on the service providers [41],
thus care should be taken to select appropriate providers. As a minimum email providers
should be selected that always use HTTPS to protect the privacy of all communications..
Chat,
VoIP
systems
Skype,
Whatsup
C*, I*, A* C*, I*, A* Alternative systems such as VoIP or chat applications are very helpful during emergency
scenarios. They do not only offer the same features from traditional communication
channels, e.g., PSTN, but can also provide additional capabilities, e.g., video and large
group calling. Nevertheless, many of these implement proprietary protocols and security
countermeasures, which imply interactions between different technologies that can also
lead to unexpected results which may in turn result in security issues [42], [43].
Legend: 0 = considered insecure; n.a. = not applicable; C = Confidentiality of data; I = Integrity of data; A = Authenticity of sender; * = known issues
VI. GUIDELINES
In this section, we summarize the main communication
technologies utilized during disaster scenarios and known
security threats found in the literature.
Table I compares communication technologies discussed in
Section V. It provides selected references to relevant infor-
mation security surveys or known vulnerabilities, as well as
security features offered by each technology (depending on
configuration). We were only able to find relatively few studies
or related work that supply directly helpful information about
possible issues, and security requirements for such technolo-
gies in disaster scenarios. The summarized technologies are
not necessarily applicable to all disaster scenarios, their im-
portance and requirements can differ according to the features
of the emergency scenario, as well as by the communication
mode(s) required. Overall, the results in Table I indicate
the lack of security for several communication technologies,
e.g., on analog radio communication, 2G cellular networks,
etc., which nonetheless continue to be major communications
channels used during disasters.
Due to the wide range of scenarios and their specific
characteristics, it is difficult to generalize and mandate spe-
cific technology choices and security settings. Likewise, it is
impractical to specify requirements for all imaginable disaster
scenarios in detail. We simply encourage practitioners to
educate themselves of these issues, so that they can make
informed decisions relevant for their situation.
Fig. 1. Flow chart for the selection of appropriate communications technolo-
gies for use during disaster scenarios
In support of this, we have attempted to identify the minimal
steps necessary to rationally select an appropriate technology
during crisis (Fig. 1).
First of all, it is important to identify possible security
threats that can arise in the crisis. Then, one can define which
communication modes are required (e.g., to transmit voice,
etc). Following this, one can also consider and specify the
minimal security requirements that a communication tech-
nology should provide in order to minimize the impact of
possible adversaries identified in the first phase. Finally, one
can select a technology or technologies from all available
technologies and verify if the technology complies with the
identified requirements.
VII. CONCLUSION
Communications technologies for emergency response pre-
dominantly focus on the establishment of communications
after a disaster. Security is often completely ignored due to
missing knowledge on security mechanisms and the complex-
ity to implement secure communications. Nevertheless, foun-
dational security features, like authentication, confidentiality
and integrity become mandatory, as without those features
significant risks result, e.g. false information can be distributed
during crisis situations, resulting in confusion or a loss of trust
amongst recipients.
To address these issues, this paper has presented an
overview of some scenarios that occur in crisis situations,
where crisis responders use insecure channels. Furthermore,
we have provided an analysis of possible threats that may
appear during a disaster, defining an adversary model. Hence,
we have described the most significant security requirements
to achieve a practicable and secure communication after a
disaster scenario.
Finally, we propose a flow chart (see Figure 1) which sum-
marizes the different steps considered necessary for choosing
an appropriate technology to communicate during a disaster
(see technology overview in Table I). It is our hope that these
contributions may be of practical assistance to emergency and
disaster responders.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This work has been funded by the German Federal Ministry
for Education and Research (BMBF) within the SMARTER
project. The authors would like to acknowledge the support
of USAID (USA), the NLnet Foundation (Netherlands), Radio
Free Asia (USA), the Shuttleworth Foundation (South Africa),
and the Australian Foreign Aid Program within the Australian
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australia).
REFERENCES
[1] L. K. Comfort and T. W. Haase, “Communication, coherence, and
collective action the impact of hurricane katrina on communications
infrastructure,” Public Works management & policy, vol. 10, no. 4, pp.
328–343, 2006.
[2] B. Fung, “How a bunch of tech geeks helped
save nepal’s earthquake victims,” 2016. [Online].
Available: http://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c id=
3&\discretionary{-}{}{}objectid=\discretionary{-}{}{}11628871
[3] L. Mayner and P. Arbon, “Defining disaster: The need for harmonisation
of terminology.” Australasian Journal of Disaster & Trauma Studies,
vol. 19, 2015.
[4] T. U. Nations, “Terminology on disaster risk reduction, from united na-
tions international strategy for disaster reduction,” 2009. [Online]. Avail-
able: http://www.unisdr.org/files/7817 UNISDRTerminologyEnglish.pdf
[5] A. Nelson, I. Sigal, D. Zambrano, and S. John, Media, Information
Systems and Communities: Lessons from Haiti. John S. and James L.
Knight Foundation, 2010.
[6] D. Yates and S. Paquette, “Emergency knowledge management and
social media technologies: A case study of the 2010 haitian earthquake,”
International Journal of Information Management, vol. 31, no. 1, pp. 6–
13, 2011.
[7] K. Szocik, “An axiological aspect of terrorism: Remarks on scott atran’s
perspective,” Journal of Applied Security Research, vol. 11, no. 2, pp.
111–123, 2016.
[8] T. Isaac, “An economic analysis of boko harams activities in the
chad-cameroon-nigeria border area,” Journal of Economic & Financial
Studies, vol. 3, no. 01, pp. 24–29, 2015.
[9] S. Rosenblatt and J. Rainey, “Katrina takes a toll on truth, news
accuracy,” 2005. [Online]. Available: http://articles.latimes.com/2005/
sep/27/nation/na-rumors27
[10] D. M. Hollis, “Cyberwar case study: Georgia 2008,”
2011. [Online]. Available: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/
cyberwar-case-study-georgia-2008
[11] C. Buckley, “China quake school critic receives one-year sentence-
group,” 2008. [Online]. Available: http://www.reuters.com/article/
idUSPEK105816
[12] deLorme, “delorme inreach,” 2016. [Online]. Available: http://www.
inreachdelorme.com/
[13] S. Giordano et al., “Mobile ad hoc networks,” Handbook of wireless
networks and mobile computing, pp. 325–346, 2002.
[14] A. Kannammal and S. S. Roy, “Survey on secure routing in mobile ad
hoc networks,” in 2016 International Conference on Advances in Human
Machine Interaction (HMI). IEEE, 2016, pp. 1–7.
[15] “Freifunk,” 2016. [Online]. Available: https://freifunk.net//en/
[16] T. Hardes, “Performance analysis and simulation of a freifunk
mesh network in paderborn using batman advanced,” 2015. [Online].
Available: http://thardes.de/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/thesis.pdf
[17] “Commotion wireless,” 2016. [Online]. Available: https:
//commotionwireless.net/
[18] D. Namiot, “On mobile mesh networks,” International Journal of Open
Information Technologies, vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 38–41, 2015.
[19] P. Gardner-Stephen, “The serval project: Practical wireless ad-
hoc mobile telecommunications,” Flinders University, Adelaide,
South Australia, Tech. Rep, 2011. [Online]. Available:
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.460.1778&
rep\discretionary{-}{}{}=-rep1&type\discretionary{-}{}{}=-pdf
[20] P. Gardner-Stephen, J. Lakeman, R. Challans, C. Wallis, A. Stulman,
and Y. Haddad, “Meshms: Ad hoc data transfer within mesh network,”
2012.
[21] P. Gardner-Stephen, A. Bettison, R. Challans, and J. Lakeman, “The
rational behind the serval network layer for resilient communications,”
Journal of Computer Science, vol. 9, no. 12, p. 1680, 2013.
[22] P. Gardner-Stephen, R. Challans, J. Lakeman, A. Bettison, D. Gardner-
Stephen, and M. Lloyd, “The serval mesh: A platform for resilient com-
munications in disaster & crisis,” in Global Humanitarian Technology
Conference (GHTC), 2013 IEEE. IEEE, 2013, pp. 162–166.
[23] D. Reina, J. Coca, M. Askalani, S. Toral, F. Barrero, E. Asimakopoulou,
S. Sotiriadis, and N. Bessis, “A Survey on Ad Hoc Networks for
Disaster Scenarios,” in Intelligent Networking and Collaborative Systems
(INCoS), 2014 International Conference on, Salerno, sep 2014, pp. 433–
438.
[24] R. Di Pietro, S. Guarino, N. V. Verde, and J. Domingo-Ferrer, “Security
in wireless ad-hoc networks–a survey,” Computer Communications,
vol. 51, pp. 1–20, 2014.
[25] F. Ricciato, A. Coluccia, and A. DAlconzo, “A review of dos attack
models for 3g cellular networks from a system-design perspective,”
Computer Communications, vol. 33, no. 5, pp. 551–558, 2010.
[26] A.-S. Ja’afer, S. Yousef, and M. A. Nabhan, “Analysis and enhancement
of authentication algorithms in mobile networks,” Journal of Applied
Sciences, vol. 6, no. 4, pp. 872–877, 2006.
[27] W. Enck, P. Traynor, P. McDaniel, and T. La Porta, “Exploiting
open functionality in sms-capable cellular networks,” in Proceedings of
the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security.
ACM, 2005, pp. 393–404.
[28] S. schneider, “Iridium system hacking,” 2015. [Online].
Available: https://events.ccc.de/congress/2015/Fahrplan/system/event
attachments\discretionary{-}{}{}/attachments\discretionary{-}{}{}/
000/002/834/original/Iridium\discretionary{-}{}{}Talk-32c3-final.pdf
[29] B. D. Peary, R. Shaw, and Y. Takeuchi, “Utilization of social media in
the east japan earthquake and tsunami and its effectiveness,” Journal of
Natural Disaster Science, vol. 34, no. 1, pp. 3–18, 2012.
[30] F. Toriumi, T. Sakaki, K. Shinoda, K. Kazama, S. Kurihara, and
I. Noda, “Information sharing on twitter during the 2011 catastrophic
earthquake,” in Proceedings of the 22Nd International Conference on
World Wide Web. ACM, 2013, pp. 1025–1028.
[31] H. S. FEMA, “National preparedness report,” p. 15, march
2013. [Online]. Available: https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/
documents/32509
[32] S. Campbell, “Facebook safety check: Fury as users
who aren’t in nepal mark themselves safe from quake,”
2015. [Online]. Available: http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/576844/
Facebook-Safety-Check-Nepal-earthquake-marked-declared-quake
[33] S. Clark, T. Goodspeed, P. Metzger, Z. Wasserman, K. Xu, and M. Blaze,
“Why (special agent) johnny (still) can’t encrypt: A security analysis
of the apco project 25 two-way radio system.” in USENIX Security
Symposium, 2011, pp. 8–12.
[34] S. Glass, V. Muthukkumarasamy, M. Portmann, and M. Robert, “Insecu-
rity in public-safety communications: Apco project 25,” in Security and
Privacy in Communication Networks. Springer, 2011, pp. 116–133.
[35] A. O. Bang and P. L. Ramteke, “Manet: history, challenges and applica-
tions,” International Journal of Application or Innovation in Engineering
& Management (IJAIEM), vol. 2, no. 9, pp. 249–251, 2013.
[36] S. Ruben, “A wake-up call for satcom security,” 2014. [Online].
Available: http://www.ioactive.com/
[37] Y. Park and T. Park, “A survey of security threats on 4g networks,” in
Globecom Workshops, 2007 IEEE. IEEE, 2007, pp. 1–6.
[38] A. N. Bikos and N. Sklavos, “Lte/sae security issues on 4g wireless
networks,” Security & Privacy, IEEE, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 55–62, 2013.
[39] J. Cao, M. Ma, H. Li, Y. Zhang, and Z. Luo, “A survey on security
aspects for lte and lte-a networks,” Communications Surveys & Tutorials,
IEEE, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 283–302, 2014.
[40] C. Zhang, J. Sun, X. Zhu, and Y. Fang, “Privacy and security for online
social networks: challenges and opportunities,” Network, IEEE, vol. 24,
no. 4, pp. 13–18, 2010.
[41] H. Gao, J. Hu, T. Huang, J. Wang, and Y. Chen, “Security issues in
online social networks,” Internet Computing, IEEE, vol. 15, no. 4, pp.
56–63, 2011.
[42] A. D. Keromytis, “Voice over ip: Risks, threats and vulnerabilities,”
Cyber Infrastructure Protection, 2011.
[43] ——, “A comprehensive survey of voice over ip security research,”
Communications Surveys & Tutorials, IEEE, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 514–
537, 2012.
